OpenClaw: Zalo webhook rate limiting could be bypassed before secret validation
Moderate severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Mar 13, 2026
in
openclaw/openclaw
•
Updated Mar 13, 2026
Description
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Mar 13, 2026
Reviewed
Mar 13, 2026
Last updated
Mar 13, 2026
Summary
The Zalo webhook handler applied request rate limiting only after webhook authentication succeeded. Requests with an invalid secret returned
401but did not count against the rate limiter, allowing repeated secret guesses without triggering429.Impact
This made brute-force guessing materially easier for weak but policy-compliant webhook secrets. Once the secret was guessed, an attacker could submit forged Zalo webhook traffic.
Affected versions
openclaw<= 2026.3.11Patch
Fixed in
openclaw2026.3.12. Rate limiting now applies before successful authentication is required, closing the pre-auth brute-force gap. Users should update to2026.3.12or later and prefer strong webhook secrets.References